them in important ways to fit the demands of helping people change. As a result, they cannot be considered identical. As an exercise in integration, I tried to fit some of Westen’s nominated self-constructs into a cognitive therapy framework. I found that there was no a priori reason why a patient could not have a sense of self they feared becoming or a view of self they fantasized achieving, or that these standpoints on the self were not potentially recoverable to awareness. Content alone seemed to be insufficient to rule out the possible self-representations proposed in his article and some even echo similar constructs which have been discussed as part of cognitive therapy for clients with personality disorders (Beck & Freeman, 1990). Rather, my difficulty lay in recognizing that the cognitive approach has generally been method rich and theory poor in conceptualizing the self and its impact on psychological functioning. Now with increased attention being paid to the self, cognitive therapists find themselves having to come to terms with a theory (i.e., psychodynamic) that, although abundant in content, is only marginally capable of being verified or falsified. Faced with this dilemma, my reaction seems to be one of waiting for a theory with a few more testable parts.

At this point, I have probably confirmed what Westen must have already concluded—namely, that the writer has a self-as-a-methodological-behaviorist representation. I think his article is important precisely because of the gap that still remains between these two approaches. There is little dis-

agreement that a client’s view of self can have a profound impact on feelings of inadequacy, unworthiness, and self-acceptance. The question of how this arises is still up for debate.

Note

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References


Challenges to the Integration of the Psychoanalytic and Cognitive Perspectives on the Self

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Before turning to an analysis of Westen’s cognitive-psychoanalytic model and its implications for personality research, I address briefly two obstacles to his laudable effort at integrating psychoanalytic and cognitive perspectives.

When Westen talks about integration, he necessarily faces the problem that within each perspective there are many competing theories, terms, and methodologies that cloud any attempt to present a unified picture of the “cognitive self” or the “psychoanalytic self.”

The Problem of Fragmentation Within Perspectives

Although the emergence of object relations and information processing theories have energized psychoanalysis and general psychology, neither approach has proven to be as unifying or dominant as the previous theories of drive reduction and behaviorism. On the one hand, Kohutians compete with Kernberg disciples, and on the other, cognitive researchers with an interest in incorporating motivational constructs into their models must choose among “possible selves,” “actual and ideal selves,” “nuclear scenes,” “personal strivings,” and “states of mind,” among others. In a sense, both perspectives have experienced a vacuum that has yet to be, and may not be, filled by one overarching paradigm.

A second obstacle to convergence within perspectives centers on the disincentive that psychologists in practice and/or academics experience with regard to unification of theoretical positions. In a pragmatic sense, theories have become commodities that are identified with particular psychological entrepreneurs and are marketed through invited lectures, workshops, and publications. To merge one’s terminology or postulates with another colleague’s means the potential sacrifice of one’s market share of professional recognition and resources. Although an ideal view of science would encourage this, the current practice of science does not.

The stakes are even higher for a practitioner whose claims for successful treatment of suffering have been based on a theoretical position identified with his or her name. To renounce this position or embrace another perspective holds not only the threat of a professional retreat, but also the prospect of undoing therapeutic gains that have been made in the name of the promoted theory.
Westen’s Effort at Integration

Given these significant obstacles to integration within perspectives, Westen attempts to step back from each perspective and ask what they have in common. Inevitably, because there is not unity within perspectives, he must resort to more general statements. I find the conclusions he draws helpful, though how they will lead to a unified operationalized model of the self that would be acceptable to both psychoanalysts and laboratory psychologists is harder to determine.

According to Westen’s reading of the psychoanalytic and cognitive literatures, there is convergence on the following postulates. The self is affective, multidimensional, and linked to representations of others’ thoughts, feelings, and values. The self is hierarchical with representations of its thoughts and desires ranging from immediate concerns to more enduring or “core” representations. The self varies in developmental complexity from simple awareness of bodily sensations to densely elaborated images of the self such as “the tragic hero” or “the person that my parents never allowed me to be.”

Drawing on these connections, Westen presents his own synthesized perspective—a cognitive-psychodynamic model of self. The individual possesses a self-system, a hierarchically organized set of self-representations that may be activated into awareness depending on a given internal or external stimulus. These self-representations range in specificity and in the degree they are connected to other self-representations, thoughts, feelings, and behavioral tendencies. They are multimodal, meaning they can be highly abstract formulations (e.g., “the achieving self”) or representations linked to sensory and affective experience (“the self that speaks with my mother’s voice” or “the hurt and angry self”).

Because multiple representations of self exist, more than one representation of self can be activated both consciously and unconsciously. Although the greater the neural activation of a particular representation, the more impact that representation will have on conscious thought, Westen does not specify the parameters that predict awareness of a particular self-representation for an individual. Evidently, the more affectively aversive and threatening a self-representation, the more likely it will be sequestered unconsciously; but greater specification on this point was not offered.

Self-representations do not exist in a vacuum in the mental architecture. They are connected not only to thoughts, images, and feelings, but to representations of relationships with others (“how my mother and I interact when I visit for the holidays”). The last important question Westen addresses in his model of the self is its motivational mechanism—how do self-representations link to behavioral tendencies?

Westen draws on an appraisal model of “cognitive-evaluative mismatches” that is indebted to work by Higgins (1987), Tomkins (1962, 1963), and George Mandler (1975). Individuals activate wished-for, feared, ideal, and fantasized self-representations; they then gauge the degree to which they have attained or avoided the representation in question. This evaluation results in an affective response that motivates the individual toward thoughts or action to reduce or increase the distance between one’s current state and one’s wished-for or feared representation. Finally, it is one’s ongoing sense of the continuity of various self-representations, as well as one’s “metamanagement” of these self-representations (involving preferences for particular representations, knowledge of their appropriateness, and tolerance of their influence), that constitutes the adult’s sense of identity over a lifetime.

Westen’s integrative effort addresses some of the major limitations he attributes to each perspective on its own. The concept of representation is defined more clearly and logically separated from the self qua self. His self-system framework is more organized and less vague than many psychoanalytic discussions of the self. On the other hand, his vision of the self-system contains wished-for and feared representations that heat up the coolly cognitive model of the self. He also makes explicit room for unconscious self-representations within both the self-system and the “working self-representations.”

The question remains, however, does this integrative perspective bring us closer to an operationalized model of personality in which the self is the central organizing structure? Other than offering a clinical example and a sketch of a proposed study, Westen leaves open more specific ways to validate the complex mechanisms of his model. There also appears no way to get around the problem that most assessments of self-representations will rely on self-report and that reliable access to warded-off representations remains elusive.

Problems With Self as an Integrative Unit of Personality

One major problem I foresee is the inclusiveness of Westen’s self-system. If self-representations operate simultaneously, are linked to imagery, affect, and behavioral tendencies, and contain conscious and unconscious aspects, then efforts to isolate or catalogue specific self-representations would seem to be hopelessly complex. Although interest in self has a metaphysical and experiential appeal, it is also an ambitious starting place for the integrating of dynamic and cognitive perspectives. What is clear throughout Westen’s reading of these literatures is that any particular self-representation is known to the individual by the goals, images of self and other, memories, fantasies, and the corresponding affects that are linked to the representation.

Although it may be, to some extent, a question of preference, I suggest that a theory of self-representation might be built more precisely through an inductive, bottom-up approach rather than a more deductive, top-down approach. Certain goals, memories, and affective states covary in response to particular internal and external stimuli. Over time, the identification of repetitive patterns of covariation in active goals, images or memories, and corresponding affective states would allow the researcher to identify a scripted cognitive-affective-behavioral sequence (à la Tomkins, 1979). The affective intensity, the thematic nature of the script, and its enduring return over time for the individual would then define it as a crucial motivating and identifying pattern for that individual.

What is the advantage of studying personality in terms of goals, memories, images, fantasies, and affective states rather than self-representations? First, subjects can more readily and more accurately answer questions such as:

1. In this situation, what did you want?
2. Did it make you recall any previous experiences?
3. What did you feel as it happened?
4. Did you have any unrealistic fantasies about the outcome?
5. What were you thinking about yourself?
6. What did you think about the other person?

If we ask subjects, "What do you typically try to do in your life?" (Emmons, 1986), subjects are much more likely to have an intuitive grasp of what is being requested than if they are asked to generate a list of typical self-representations. Similarly, when we ask subjects for personally significant memories, subjects are able to provide narrative memories that are affectively intense and linked to major goals in their lives (Moffitt & J. A. Singer, 1991; J. A. Singer, 1990; J. A. Singer & Moffitt, 1991–1992). In these studies, subjects were also able to report on their affective responses to the recall of memories. Through thought-sampling techniques, Klos and J. L. Singer (1981) were able to demonstrate the persisting influence on subjects of unresolved conflicts with parents. This influence was identified through particular topics of thought rather than global self-representations or other-representations.

Admittedly, these approaches, operating at the level of self-report of conscious experience, lose the richness invoked through psychoanalytic inference of unconscious influences on thoughts and behavior. However, the common goal in linking a clinical perspective to a laboratory-based perspective is to build a testable theory of personality. I argue that the best place to start for such a theory is with aspects of the personality that are accessible and measurable. Even though the greatest contribution psychoanalytic psychology makes to general psychology is its emphasis on the unconscious, it also recognizes the important role that emotions, desires, memories, and conscious fantasies play in our functioning. Through the work of Emmons (1986), Izard (1977), McAdams (1989), Larsen (Larsen, Diener, & Emmons, 1986), Pervin (1983), and J. L. Singer (1988), among others, we have begun to operationalize and measure these components of personality. Through the careful linking of these components, we can build a rich structure that is defined by the repetition of sequences of these components in a kind of genetic code of personality. This inductive approach has the advantage of keeping us both close to measurable constructs and to the actual thoughts and feelings of the individuals we study.

As Westen makes clear, there is no need for an either—or approach. Laboratory-research emphasis on self-report and more microcomponents of personality does not and should not preclude the analysis of case material and the use of trained raters to extract unconscious themes or representations from narrative content, whether memories, dreams, or projective test protocols. Yet as one familiar with the early memory literature (see Bruhn, 1984, for an extensive review) and with the efforts of Mardi Horowitz's MacArthur Project on the Unconscious (Horowitz, 1991), I can attest that elaborating scoring systems, highly sensitive to nuances of ego psychology and object relations, are painstakingly slow to develop and difficult to replicate. While we forge ahead with better methods of content analysis and interrater reliability in assessing unconscious claims on the self, we should keep in mind the exciting developments regarding goals, memories, and affect that are taking place in the resurgent field of personal psychology.

Note

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References


